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BY 
THIJS TEN RAA* 
Usually book reviews are published as short notes. This practice enables the 
reader to acquaint himself at leisure with new, often bulky work. Originally, my 
review of Frans van Winden's Ph.D.  dissertation,  On the Interaction between 
State  and  Private  Sector:  A  Study  in  Political  Economics,  State  University 
Leyden,  1981,  viii  +  319  pages, 1 was no exception.  The short note format, 
however, has a drawback, namely that it leaves no room for the author to defend 
himself against criticism which he finds unfair or otherwise below standards. 
Fortunately,  the  Editor  of this journal  kindly provided additional  space to 
expand  the  review to  an article,  a  format which facilitates comments by the 
author of the book. 
Having whet the appetite of the reader, let me begin with saying what On the 
Interaction between State and Private Sector is all about. This book of over 300 
pages consolidates Van Winden's research since its beginnings ten years ago. 
His area of interest  is  the  interaction  between  state  and private sector.  Van 
Winden has a good sense for importance and relevance in furthering economics 
as a science. The role of the state as an integrated part of the economy as a whole 
is indeed an important yet neglected subject in the literature. Perhaps the state of 
affairs is somewhat comparable to that of capital theory half a century ago. At 
the time capital stock statistics of sectors of the economy were single 'values' 
and could be used only to check the feasibility of a bundle of final goods given an 
exogenous 'amount' of capital. Only disaggregation of capital stock statistics by 
sector of origin cleared the way for true dynamic modelling with endogenous 
accumulation.  Similarly,  government  statistics  are still  aggregated and used 
outside the core of economic models as exogenous variables. To clear the way 
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for  economic  modelling  of the  state  in  relation  to the  private sector,  more 
detailed statistics of government activities are required, and, for this purpose, 
new theory must guide us. 
Van Winden aims at filling the gap. His book attempts to present a nonnor- 
mative, theoretical analysis of the interaction between state and private sector in 
a capitalist economy. Given the state of affairs and the proclaimed objective, the 
book will be reviewed from the standpoint of orthodox economic theory. Since 
the author undertakes his analysis at the macro level, using classes rather than 
individual agents, game theory supports his arguments from time to time and, as 
a chapter of economic theory, will also be used in this review. Technicalities will 
be kept at a minimum as the subject is also of clear interest to the nontheorist. 
For easy cross reference, numbers of sections in this review correspond with 
chapters of On  the Interaction  between  State  and Private  Sector. 
Van Winden has the merit that he defines all his concepts, however philosophi- 
cal  they  may be.  Perhaps  he  goes a  little too  far by introducing  names for 
concepts which he suggests to be novel. He even lets his work define a new field, 
namely  'Political  Economics,'  as  opposed  to  political  economy  and  other 
established  branches.  I  shall  attempt to relate Van  Winden's  notions  to  the 
orthodox concepts of economic theory, to delineate his contribution. 
The  central  concept  of this  book  is  interaction.  To  define  it,  the  author 
considers  two  agents,  i  and j, which can choose from activity sets A i and Aj, 
respectively (17,  19).  Since A i and Aj are choice sets, they contain at least two 
elements, say a i and a'i, and aj and ~  respectively. Now, "agent i is said to interact 
with agent j, if and only if there exists a function ri: Aj -- A i such that ri(aj) :~ 
ri(dj) for some aj, djeAf'  (19). In other words, the author defines the concept of 
interaction by the existence of a function from one agent's choice set to another 
one's such that different values are assumed; the function is to describe an exter- 
nality. This point of departure is quite nonsensical, for such a function always 
exists.  Simply take ri:  Aj  ~  A i  defined by ri(aj)  =  ai,  ri(~)  =  a i and all other 
values arbitrary.  Then r i fulfills the condition  of different values, so that, by 
Van Winden's definition, the agents interact. Since the agents were taken arbi- 
trarily, it follows that Van Winden's definition implies that everybody interacts 
with everybody and, therefore, it is weird. I assume the author really means that 
the entire choice sets of an agent is a function of the actions of other ones, or, 
formally, that  interaction  is defined by the existence of a  function ri: Aj ~  A 
where A  is the family of all choice sets, such that A i ~- ri(aj) r  ri(d  j) =  A~ for 
some aj, dj~ Aj. But then the concept of  interaction is precisely that ofa generalised 
game  in  Debreu's  social  equilibrium  analysis where  strategy sets of players 
depend on the actions of others. Since the strategy set is dependent on others, so 
will be the element which a  maximising agent will pick as his actual strategy. THE INTEREST FUNCTION APPROACH  481 
Having defined some more concepts, which we shall mention when we need 
them, Van Winden  develops a  sequence of models of increasing complexity. 
The first model serves as a prototype. We shall discuss it in some detail, refining 
the game-theoretical framework in the process. 
The economy consists of two sectors: the private sector and the state. The 
private sector transforms labour and capital into the so-called private product. 
The state transforms labour into services. The private product is consumed by 
all agents in the economy, but is not used to augment the stock of capital, which 
is fixed.  The state services only enter the  utility of those favouring the state 
which, therefore, is a self-satisfying institution and not, as the author suggests, 
the supplier of a pure public good. (A pure public good is defined to be enjoyed 
by all in common.) The 'welfare' of the private sector is simply equated with the 
private consumption part of the private product. Basically the economy is made 
up of Keynesian parts. Now how does the system work? Here the author casts 
the model in a  game-theoretical framework. 
The players of the game are the private and the state sectors. Their strategies 
are their input demand variables plus, in the case of the state, the tax rates. These 
are chosen such as to maximise utilities. The private sector wants to maximise 
profits after taxes. The state is modelled as a  composite player maximising a 
weighted  average of the private and public consumption parts of the private 
product. Thus, the state reflects the power of those who want to promote private 
consumption versus those who advocate public consumption. The correspond- 
ing  interests  are weighted  according  to  the  political  power balance and  this 
yields the state's objective function. 
The rules of the game are assumed to favour the state. Firms are small and 
numerous;  they  do  not  cooperate  and  take  prices  and  tax  rates  as  given. 
Consequently the private sector is a degenerate player which, given the strategy 
of the state, merely performs the usual maximum profit calculation. The state, 
however, consists of agents which, however varied the interests they represent, 
have agreed to cooperate on the basis of a weighting of the underlying interests 
and to act forcefully. The state even takes into account the repercussions of its 
strategies on the private sector. Since it knows the behaviour of the price and tax 
rate taking private sector, the equilibrium of the game is determined by solving 
the  state problem of maximising its objective function,  based on the agreed- 
upon  weights  for private versus public  consumption.  Such  an equilibrium  is 
defined as a Stackelberg equilibrium. (The author's definition of an equilibrium 
(28) is misleading as it concerns a Nash equilibrium which is relevant in games 
with symmetric rules, unlike the present one. A footnote (264) repairs some of 
the damage by explicit reference to the Stackelberg equilibrium, but does not 
affect the definition of equilibrium.) 482  TH. TEN RAA 
The pursuits  of individual  and public happinesses compete in two rounds. 
First they are weighted to determine the objective function of the state. Then the 
state plays a Stackelberg game with the private sector. Since the state is almighty 
in the second round, the real game is played, ironically, in the first phase where 
weights are determined. Now, as has been observed before, the modelling of  the 
state is essentially cooperative. Whatever the political weights for private versus 
public consumption, the state maximises the implied average. The economy is 
pushed  towards the  so-called Pareto efficiency frontier  where,  by definition, 
neither the private nor the public consumption part of private output can be 
increased  without  diminishing  the  other.  Inefficiencies  which  typically  are 
present  in  economies with few players representing class interests are simply 
ruled  out  by the  assumptions  of cooperative behaviour within  the state and 
domination of the private sector by the state. Keynesian multiplier effects are 
pre-empted, the  economy is  already maximising consumption  as a  weighted 
average of its private and public parts. 
The second model  comprises a  more detailed  picture  of the  structure  of the 
economy and is used as a basis for subsequent analysis. The model is dynamic 
with time running through a discrete and finite index set. Although stochastics 
are absent, expectations are formed. Expectations are not rational but static. 
The state expects the price level and private product demand to be equal to the 
last available price and transaction figures, firms expect labour productivity to 
remain, and so on. As before, the private sector transforms labour and capital 
into the private product, while the state transforms labour into a nonmarketed 
product. The private product is also used for investment and accumulated state 
output now feeds private productivity. 
The whole model is given by 36 equations which describe, for example, the 
assumptions that state labour demand does not exceed the available force and, 
vice versa, labour supply is a  function of demand which even may exceed the 
total labour force, the  assumption  of an exogenous  minimum state size, the 
presence  of a  statutory minimum  consumption  basket,  a  maximum tax rate 
"which  may be  violated"  (61),  a  balanced  budget,  a  Phillips  curve,  a  zero 
households' propensity to save and investment linkage to the so-called excess 
funds which are basically current profits, and inflationary pricing as a function 
of excess demand. 
The players are the private sector, the state, and also the households. Their 
instruments  are  their  input  demand  variables plus,  for the  state,  a  uniform 
income  tax  rate.  The  households  'act' mechanically.  Their labour supply is 
essentially  inelastic  (ignoring  the  erratic  dependence  on  labour  demand  by 
which supply may even exceed the available force). Since the Phillips curve and 
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mine  the  wage  rate,  income  is  given.  All  income  is  then  spent  on  current 
consumption,  since the propensity to save is, by assumption, zero. 
So  far  the  households.  Firms  are  still  small  and  numerous;  they  do  not 
cooperate and take tax rates as given. They do know, however, aggregate excess 
demand  and  adjust  the  product  price  as  a  function  thereof.  The  quantity 
decision  is  straightforward.  Labour  demand  is  determined  by the  available 
capital stock through the production function which has conveniently turned 
Leontief-like;  with  fixed  input  proportions,  and  the  capital  stock  equal  to 
accumulated investment. Thus, it remains to determine the level of investment. 
Investment  is  financed  by retained  earnings.  New  capital  can  be  used  two 
periods later and then yields returns given by, essentially, the wage and price 
levels which are extrapolated in the described static expectations fashion. The 
new capital will also be productive in the further future, three  periods later and 
onward.  This  fact,  however,  is  ignored  by assuming an overwhelming time 
preference  discount  rate.  There  is just  a  simple  trade-off between  a  dollar 
foregone now and its return two periods later, as determined by the prices and 
the discount factor. The Leontief specification of technology, so convenient for 
the determination of labour demand, now proves troublesome. Basically, there 
are two possibilities.  Either the rate of return exceeds one, in which case it is 
profitable to invest all you can. Or the rate of return falls short of one, in which 
case it is best not to invest at all. In the hairline case investment is indeterminate. 
As is typical for constant-returns-to-scale models, price taking profit maximisa- 
tion yields bang-bang behaviour. To avoid this complication the author invokes 
a brute force argument and respecifies the utility function of the firms. Although 
he suggests that utility equals a discounted expected flow of dividends (which 
are profits minus investment reservations), he really specifies a Cobb-Douglas 
function  of  the  dividends  now  and  two  periods  later with time  preference 
exponents (65). This nonlinear construct renders extreme behaviour (investing 
all or nothing)  unattractive and rounds off the modelling of the firms' behav- 
iour.  Putting the specification aside, firms once more do the usual maximum 
profit calculation and thus constitute a  degenerate player. 
The state player is more fully developed. It maximises a weighted average of 
private and state output, but now also of deviations from an ideal growth path, 
all taken instantaneously.  Thus, the state reflects the power of private versus 
public good advocates as well as of bureaucrats. These interests are weighted 
according to the political power balance. However varied their interests, state 
participants stick with the weights and agree to cooperate in the 'game' versus 
the households  and the firms who act predictably, as just described. 
An equilibrium  is redefined by the condition of"the constancy of all variables 
over time."  This is  a  departure  from economic theory where  equilibrium  is 
defined either as a cancelling out of forces such as supply and demand, or more 
general, as a set of strategies which are attainable and best in terms of own utility 
functions. It does not follow that equilibrium values are constant; particularly 484  TH. TEN RAA 
in the present model, where accumulated state output feeds private productivi- 
ty, it would be exceptional to find 'constancy of all variables' since in fact state 
output  would  have to be and  remain just equal  to  the depreciation  of state 
capital (60).  In short, stationarity is mistaken for equilibrium. 
The first proposition claims that "equilibrium' as just defined need neither 
exist nor be unique.  The second proposition claims that all expectations are 
realised. This is trivial since 'expectations' are static and 'equilibrium' is defined 
by stationarity.  The  third  proposition  claims  that  the  capital  stock  is fully 
utilised,  but  labour  may be underemployed.  This  asymmetry is remarkable, 
especially in view of the state's capability to absorb all unproductive labour but 
no capital, to coin a Marxist phrase for a change. Further propositions present 
'equilibrium' values in relation to the 'type of state,' that is, the political weights 
in the state's objective function. 
So far the focus has been on macroeconomic relationships with relatively little 
attention given to the behaviour of economic agents. In the central, third model, 
actions  of the  participants  are  related  to  their  economic  positions  through 
so-called interest functions. The author calls this approach the 'Interest Func- 
tion Approach ~ and distinguishes his study by the name of 'Political Econom- 
ics', posting it next to mainstream economics, Marxism, and 'Public Choice.' 
In  the  present  state  of affairs,  'Political Economics' is based on  the  Van 
Winden 'Interest Function Approach.' Here the primitive is a so-called elemen- 
tary  interest  function,  of which  there  are  four  types,  one  for  each  kind  of 
mutually exclusive economic agents: state sector workers, private sector wor- 
kers,  capitalists,  and  unemployed  (96,  100).  Each  elementary  interest  is  a 
function  of three variables, namely, average real disposable income, average 
state goods availability, and the numerical strength of the respective class. The 
first two variables feed the interest of an agent directly in utility fashion. The last 
variable is included as it relates to the extent to which agents are able to realise 
their interests (98). Here the author mixes up the objective function itself(utility 
or elementary interest) and the structure or means (such as elections) through 
which it is maximised. Anyway, the presence of 'class mates' is assumed to have 
a  positive effect on  the  elementary interest  of an economic agent.  Thus,  an 
elementary interest function is basically a utility function featuring externalities. 
Van Winden also specifies the functional form, taking it as of the Cobb-Douglas 
variety. 
Firms  are now assumed  to  act in accordance with the capitalists' interest. 
More precisely, firms maximise the capitalist elementary interest function. The 
state,  however,  is  assumed  to  maximise  a  weighted  average of elementary 
interests  with  the  weights  representing the power of the four classes. In Van 
Winden's terminology, the state acts in accordance with the maximisation of a THE INTEREST FUNCTION APPROACH  485 
'complex interest  function' (101,  109).  Thus, a  complex interest function is a 
weighted  average  of utility  functions,  which  is  clearly  nothing  but  a  social 
welfare function. 
As regards the model, the Van Winden Interest Function Approach amounts 
to,  essentially,  a  respecification of the  state's objective function.  Yet all the 
equations are reproduced. An unrelated but simultaneous change elsewhere in 
the  model  is  the  introduction  of some minimum payment in  the  before-tax 
incomes of capitalists (110,  115).  'Equilibrium' is still defined by the condition 
of 'the constancy of all variables over time.' Although the present model closely 
resembles  the  preceding  one,  the  whole  'equilibrium' analysis  is done  over. 
Changes are reported in the labour share of disposable income (126) and in the 
domains of the political weights in the social welfare function or in the 'types of 
state' that bring about certain 'equilibrium' values of model variables (128-132). 
While  the  modelling of the private sector has been straightforward -  agents 
maximise their elementary interest functions -  the treatment of the state is more 
complex since it involves political weights for the various elementary interests. 
The weights reflect the class structure of the state and are clearly significant for 
the distribution of income and so on, as will be implicit in model outcomes. To 
pave the way for closure of the theory in the sense of explaining the weights in 
the social welfare function, the politicalprocess  is modelled. The purpose is to 
determine the character and relative power of incumbent and opposition parties 
and the room of politicians to promote their interests vis-3-vis the bureaucrats. 
While  the  bureaucrats  are  linked  directly  to  their  own  elementary  interest 
function, the parties are reduced to elementary interests by their class structures, 
as the author suggests (166). 
The determination  of the state organism is through voting and government 
coalition  formation.  Using  their  elementary  interest  functions  voters  value 
political parties' performances. In case of coalitions ratings are apportioned by 
size.  To allow for habit formation,  the  valuation  is made dependent  on the 
previous choice.  Rather than absolute determinants of choice, the valuations 
are  merely taken as  likelihoods  to prevent uniform  behaviour of same type 
voters. Here the author assumes a  logit specification (148). 
After the  elections,  a  cabinet must be formed. The basic idea is that some 
parties which command a majority form a coalition which they find attractive. 
The attractiveness of a coalition for a party, say oh, is a weighted average of the 
attractiveness of the constituent parties o i for oh, which in turn, are speculated to 
be indicated by the rate old oh-voters drifted away to o i (171). In other words, 
parties find competitors to which they lose voters attractive and are eager to 
form a  coalition with them. 
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oh-voters valuated parties o i which determined the likelihood of floating to o i at 
election  date  T. These floating rates are taken as oi-attractiveness indicators, 
Qohoi(T), as perceived by party o  h.  For example, if (176) 
00101(7)  =  0.6  Qo2o1(7)  =  0.3  Qoao,(T)  =  0.1 
aolo2(T)  =  0.3  00202(7)  =  0.2  aoao2(T)  =  0.1 
Qoloa(7)  =  0.1  Qo2o3(T)  =  0.5  00303(7)  =  0.8 
then the first column shows that most old ol-voters remained loyal, but many 
floated to o 2 and  only a  few to 03. Therefore, party 01 is assumed to find 02 
attractive. Now let the numbers of parliamentary seats of parties or, o e and 03 be 
20, 40 and 40 (173). Then there are four majority coalitions to consider, namely: 
1  2 
A1  =3  ol  +  3  02, 
1  2 
A2  =  3Ol  +3oa, 
1  1 
a3  =  02  +  03, and 
1  2  2  a= ol  § 
Thus, the first coalition, A1, consists, in numbers of seats, one third of party 01, 
and two thirds of party 02. Van Winden assumes that the attractiveness of this 
coalition for party o I is  a  geometrically weighted  average of the constituent 
party attractiveness given by the first column of the previous matrix: 0.61/3 0.32/3 
•  0.38. Note that the power weights are simply taken to be proportional to the 
numbers of parliamentary seats of the parties. Reweighting the party attractive- 
nesses of the first column for the second coalition, we obtain 0.61/30.12/3  =  0.18 
as the attractiveness of coalition/~2 for party o r  By assumption, the attractive- 
ness of coalition  A3 is neglected for it excludes party o 1. Lastly, the attractive- 
ness of the grand coalition, A4, for party 01 amounts 0.61/5 0.3 2/3 0.12/5= 0.22. 
The party o 1 ratings of the four coalitions are collected in the first column of the 
so-called coalition attractiveness matrix (176), 
Or  ~_ 
0.38  0.23  - - -01 
.18  ....  0.4 
....  0.32  0.28 I 
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The attractivenesses  of the coalitions  for party 0 2  are  obtained by weighting 
entries of the second column of the Qohoir(T)-matrix and reported in the second 
column  of Qr.  The third  column of Qr represents party 03's valuation of the 
coalitions. 
The attractiveness matrix, Qr, is used to determine which coalition is formed. 
Here an equilibrium coalition must, by Van Winden's definition, be undomina- 
ted. A  coalition A s dominates  A r if all participants of A s value their coalition 
higher  than  A r.  In  other words,  the  entries  of the s-th  row of the  coalition 
attractiveness  matrix,  Qr,  exceed  the  respective entries  of the r-th row.  For 
example, coalition A 3 dominates coalition A~. Therefore, A 1  is not undominated 
and,  by definition,  it is no equilibrium  coalition.  Parties which  command a 
majority (02  and 03) prefer another coalition (a3).  Note that coalition A l, in 
turn, dominates A 2 which is, therefore, no equilibrium coalition either. It is even 
more remarkable that A 2 dominates A 3. Thus we have a cycle in the pattern of 
domination which clearly is no transitive relation. This cycle rules out the first 
three coalitions as equilibrium candidates. The remainder A 4 is no equilibrium 
coalition either as it is dominated by A 3. 
The elementary interest functions  of the voters, and the consequent valua- 
tions of parties and floating between them, determine an attractiveness matrix 
which admits no undominated coalition. By Van Winden's definition, there is 
no political equilibrium and his model cannot be solved in the present example. 
If, however, old o2-voters would not have floated so much to 03, say Qo2o2(T)  = 
0.5 and Qo2o3(T  ) =  0.2 instead, then o2's valuation of coalition A 1  would increase 
from  0.23  to  0.42.  The  other  rates  of the  second  column  of  Q~  would  be 
unaffected,  as  would  be  the  first  and  third  columns.  In  this  case  the  first 
coalition A I, is most attractive to both its participants, o I and o 2. Thus, parties o 1 
and  02  would  form the  government  and  influence  the weights  in  the  social 
welfare function vis-~-vis the bureaucracy in accordance with the preferences of 
their own constituencies and, by assumption, proportionally to their relative 
parliamentary strengths. 
The last model pulls everything together, making some ad hoc simplifications 
and  specifications  in  the  process.  Since  the  Van  Winden  Interest  Function 
Approach reshaped, in effect, the state by reducing its social welfare function to 
class interests, the last model is essentially the same as the third model with, 
however, endogenous weights in the state's objective function. More precisely, 
the third model is modified as follows (205-207): 
a.  Elementary interest functions subsume an infinite time preference for wor- 
kers and unemployed who consequently ignore the future, but a time horizon 
for  capitalists  extending  two  periods  into  the  future.  "The  investment 
process forces them to look into the future." 488  TH. TEN RAA 
b.  The economic position is fixed once and for all for capitalists and determined 
by the labour market for all others. 
c.  There are two, exogenous, political parties. 
d.  When  one  party is  incumbent,  the  weights  in  the  social welfare function 
assume exogenous values. 
e.  Since  there  are only two parties, the government is simply formed by the 
winner. 
f.  Weights are specified for incumbency in the "expected interest realization 
ratings of parties" (226). 
An equilibrium is defined by "the constancy of all variables (in the economic 
as well as political sphere) over time and the existence of a  dominant party" 
(208). Note that in general, when there are more parties, the dominance require- 
ment voids the definition.  In the present case the combination of 'equilibrium' 
conditions implies that one party is dominant once and for all (209). 
The equilibrium analysis is poor; propositions merely entail that most pre- 
viously derived properties carry over to the present model, some properties no 
longer hold, and values of some variables are affected. In other words, endoge- 
nising  the  weights  in  the  social  welfare  function  and  specifying structural 
variables invalidate some old results and change some parameter values. From 
the viewpoint of theory, the model's explanatory power is not increased. "The 
main consequence is that an equilibrium need no longer be an equilibrium for 
more than one type of state" (227).  But, since closure as well as specification 
deceive -  witness modifications a through f- they need to be justified in terms of 
explanatory power. This basic requirement is met neither by the 'main conse- 
quence' quoted here, nor by the other propositions. 
After the presentation  and analysis of his complete politicoeconomic model, 
Van  Winden  provides some musings on pressure groups. The author defines 
pressure as deliberate attempts by agents in the private sector to influence the 
state. The influence manifests itself as constraints on the activity set of the state; 
the author refers to his concept of 'interaction' (229). "Any rather comprehe  n - 
sive analysis of the  interaction  between state and private sector of advanced 
capitalist economies should pay attention to the fact that huge organizations 
have developed that cannot be considered as insignificant and anonymous to 
the state" (230). 
Since the author finds direct modelling of pressure as constraint generators 
too  complex,  he  takes  a  roundabout  approach  to  the  problem.  Instead  of 
dealing explicitly with constraints, he augments the interest function. Thus, let 
the  interest  or  objective  function  of collectivity  c  be Pc (233).  Subject  it  to 
pressure group p. Then the author represents the constraints exercised byp onto 
c by assuming that c acts in accordance with the maximisation of the so-called 
augmented interest function THE INTEREST FUNCTION APPROACH  489 
pl-hpX  C  --p 
where ~. indicates the strength with which the interest ofp are represented (233). 
Note  that,  taking  logarithm  and  dividing  through,  an  equivalent  objective 
function is 
logP  c  +  ulogep 
where  g  =  ~./(1-X) is the  Lagrangean multiplier which arises in the problem: 
maximise (log) Pc subject to the constraint that (log)Pp is at least equal to some 
minimum  value.  This  latter  problem,  indeed,  is  a  precise  representation of 
pressure exercised by group p onto collectivity c. Unfortunately this justification 
of the 'augmented interest function' is missing in the thesis. Essentially, the Van 
Winden Augmented Interest Function Approach to pressure is nothing but the 
Lagrangean representation of a constraint in maximisation. 
Although  Van  Winden  introduces,  presents  and  discusses  his  augmented 
interest function, he does not incorporate it in his model. If the author would 
mean that pressure does not belong to the subject of economic modelling and, 
therefore, can be left alone, he ignores the fact that allocation of scarce resources 
takes place to a large extent through political decision-making such as lobbying. 
Let us judge the book by its own standards.  In other words, does it present a 
nonnormative,  theoretical analysis of the interaction between state and private 
sector in a capitalist economy? Van Winden's pressure musings confirm that his 
interaction  concept was  wrongly defined and,  instead,  should  be  that  of a 
generalised game in Debreu's social equilibrium analysis.  The latter theory, 
though old, is more solid and promising than the present one. Van Winden's 
analysis fails to meet a number of theoretical requirements. 
Economic laws, such as of supply and demand, are inserted at the wrong level 
of analysis, namely the assumptions rather than the propositions. The author 
does not have the definitions straight. Equilibrium is confused with stationarity 
and  game-theoretic  equilibria  are  not  clearly distinguished  either.  Another 
annoying shortcoming at  the conceptual level is the author's substitution of 
seemingly novel notions for established concepts. After elimination of errors 
and some further analysis his 'interaction,' 'elementary interest function,' 'com- 
plex interest function' and 'augmented interest function' simply relate to the 
orthodox notions of general game, utility function, social welfare function and 
Lagrangean function. In the first cases the author alludes to this correspondence 
in a footnote, but more modest use of 'new' concepts in the body of the text 
would enhance readability (275). 
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tion.  First,  the  degree  of specification is  too high for a  theoretical treatise. 
Second, the author is opportunistic in Switching from neoclassical specifications 
such  as  the  Cobb-Douglas  function  to  classical  ones  such  as  the  Leontief 
function and back again if convenient. He is so ruthless in his exercise that all 
kinds of asymmetries are implicit in his models such as in the time preference of 
workers versus capitalists, the inputs and their productivity in the state versus 
the private sector, and the utilisation of various resources. These features are 
￿9  not questioned by the author. 
The  organisation  of the  book  as  a  sequence  of models  is  pedagogically 
promising  but,  unfortunately, not  successful.  Besides  making  the book too 
thick, refinements and 'novelties' such as production relations between the state 
and the private sector as well as the Van Winden Interest Function approach, 
have  impact  which  is  difficult to  trace,  due  to  unrelated  but  simultaneous 
changes elsewhere in the models, such as the introduction of time. Incidentally, 
the  treatment  of 'time'  is  so  rudimentary that  the  simple  device of dating 
commodities is  feasible, which would facilitate equilibrium analysis of plans 
agents make at time zero contingent upon possible realisations. This so-called 
Arrow  contingency analysis  would  be  more  appropriate  than  the  author's 
'expectations without stochastics.' 
The use of game theory is also weak. For example the assumption that voters 
apportion coalition partners' performance ratings by size underestimates the 
power of parties that tip the balance. Game theory provides rules for ascribing 
power more accurately, such as the so-called Harsanyi-Shapley Nontransfer- 
able-Utility Value. Moreover, the fact that voters' valuations may produce no 
undominated coalition of winners should not break down political equilibrium 
analysis altogether as it did in the example described. More liberal equilibrium 
definitions such as the so-called von Neumann-Morgenstern solution concept, 
determine sets of possible coalition outcomes. Although such concepts offer no 
unique outcome of the political game, they are more widely applicable than Van 
Winden's definition of political equilibrium. Once more, his specification is too 
restrictive. 
My main critique applies to the core of the book: the Van Winden Interest 
Function Approach.  Collectivities, the state in particular, are modelled as if 
they maximise the utilities of the constituent classes, weighted according to the 
power balance'. Certainly, the class structure and political power balance are 
thus crucial determinants of the political and economic outcomes. But, whatever 
the weights, participants cooperate to maximise some average of their utilities, 
thus securing a Pareto efficient allocation. The 'Interest Function Approach,' 
for  given  political  weights,  yields  a  Pareto  optimum,  and  variation  of the 
weights is essentially a device for scanning the efficiency frontier, the hallmark 
of normative theory. The incapability to describe inefficiencies in the interaction 
between state and private sector is a serious shortcoming of a theoretical analysis 
that pretends to be nonnormative. 
This book is barely a contribution to economic analysis. THE INTEREST FUNCTION APPROACH  491 
Summary 
THE INTEREST FUNCTION APPROACH 
This article reviews Frans van Winden's Ph.D. dissertation, On the Interaction between State and 
Private Sector: A Study in Political Economics, State University Leyden, 1981, viii +  319 pages. The 
proclaimed objective of the book is to present a nonnormative, theoretical analysis of the interaction 
between state and private sector in a capitalist economy. Review of  the analysis leads us to conclude 
that the objective is not met. 
THE  INTEREST  FUNCTION  APPROACH:  A  REPLY 
In this reply I will first go into Ten Raa's main critique concerning the Interest 
Function Approach. I will then present my main critique on his article, and end 
with some final remarks. Numbers in parentheses refer to the sections of Ten 
Raa's article. 
1.  Ten  Raa's  main  critique  (8):  "Collectivities,  the  state  in  particular,  are 
modelled as if they maximise the utilities of the constituent classes, weighted 
according to the power balance (...) thus securing a Pareto efficient allocation" 
(emphasis added), "The incapability to describe inefficiencies in the interaction 
between  state  and  private  sector  is  a  serious  shortcoming  of a  theoretical 
analysis that pretends to be nonnormative." In order to show that this main 
critique makes no sense at all, I will first remind the reader of the definition of a 
Pareto  efficient  allocation  and  then  shortly  discuss  the  way that  the  state 
operates according to the Interest Function  Approach. 
A  Pareto efficient allocation demands that it is not possible to increase the 
welfare (utility) of an individual without hurting the welfare of someone else. In 
case of state-provided collective goods it is, more specifically, demanded that 
the  sum  over all individuals  of the  marginal rates of substitution  between a 
collective good and a private good equals the marginal rate of transformation 
between these goods (Samuelson's efficiency condition). Now, will the state as 
conceived  of in  the  Interest  Function  Approach  realize  a  Pareto  efficient 
allocation  as  contended  by Ten  Raa? Definitely not.  According  to  that  ap- 
proach the people that man the state organization (state sector workers: bureau- 
crats and politicians)  strive after their own interests.  People outside the state 
organization will only succeed in getting their interests promoted by the state to 
the extent that they accumulate enough pressure on state sector workers so that 
a 'vested-effective-interest,' or an 'acknowledged power,' is established. Only in 